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EssEntial sErvicEs as  
countErinsurgEncy stratEgy
By J e f f r e y  P h i l i P  T r e i s T m a n
B y 2006, U.S. Iraq policy, based on the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, appeared to be failing. The February 
bombing of the al-Askari Mosque sparked 
a wave of sectarian violence that seemed to 
push Iraq to the brink of civil war. The United 
Nations estimated nearly 25,000 Iraqis fell 
victim to violence over the course of 2006, and 
nearly 1,000 U.S. troops were killed. Violence 
had reached record levels and thousands 
began to flee the country, crippling the entire 
nation. Analogies to the Vietnam War were 
increasingly drawn.
On January 10, 2007, President George 
W. Bush announced a “new way forward in 
Iraq” that would improve security by focusing 
predominantly on Baghdad where the major-
ity of the violence transpired.1 The plan called 
for intensifying American involvement while 
simultaneously pressing the government of 
Iraq to assume a leading role. A “surge” of 
an additional 21,500 troops would provide 
breathing room for political reconciliation 
and economic development. This new strat-
egy would become known as the Baghdad 
Security Plan, or Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) in 
Arabic.
The preponderance of postsurge analy-
sis is devoted to military operations and their 
subsequent efficacy in reducing levels of vio-
lence by concentrating on troop deployments, 
tactics, and intelligence. Such studies are valu-
able, but only to a certain extent. Any holistic 
appraisal must also consider noncombat 
counterinsurgency strategies that addressed 
social issues—in particular, essential services. 
Reminiscent of Lebanon’s Hizballah, militias 
in Baghdad sought ascendency over services 
as a means to solidify control and influence. 
Therefore, the most pragmatic remedy for 
long-term stability in Iraq was not necessarily 
countering militants with force, but securing 
the populace’s allegiance to their government 
through the provision of services and oppor-
tunities for employment.
The fundamental issue was that the 
average citizen was physically and eco-
nomically vulnerable to malign influences. It 
became imperative for the coalition to counter 
militias by guaranteeing the well-being of 
Baghdad’s residents. Emphasizing reconstruc-
tion projects not only improved the delivery of 
services, but also, more importantly, provided 
employment, reestablished the integrity of the 
Iraqi government, and created stakeholders in 
the overall process.
Importance of Services
Counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists 
posit that there is no direct correlation 
between the availability of essential services 
and violence.2 Specifically in terms of Iraq, 
some areas had far lower levels of violence and 
less accessibility to services than others. On 
the other hand, unemployment and illiteracy 
in an atmosphere of competing factions made 
individuals economically vulnerable and thus 
susceptible to malevolent influences. The 
vacuum created by political power struggles 
was certainly not propitious and allowed 
militias to supersede official institutions in 
providing public goods and employment. 
Militants were able to offer employment to 
those with little work experience, education, 
or training, and in return the conscripts 
received a salary, immunity from attack, and a 
social sense of belonging.
As a result, it became increasingly 
evident that provision of services would be 
indispensable in countering both insurgents 
and militias. A cooperative effort emerged 
between the U.S. Embassy and coalition 
forces that emphasized essential services 
as a central COIN tactic. Jobs generated 
from official reconstruction initiatives were 
extremely valuable in thwarting recruitment 
efforts of malignant actors. At the same time, 
government-sanctioned projects reduced the 
public’s dependency on extralegal groups for 
services and simultaneously strengthened the 
government’s integrity. Finally, tapping local 
labor pools engendered stakeholders in neigh-
borhood construction projects and fostered 
an intolerance to sabotage. The strategy was 
tremendously vital in enervating the strength 
of militias in Baghdad.
In contrast, attempts to pass key legisla-
tion intended to eliminate political incentives 
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of terrorists proved slow and inadequate. Par-
liamentarians within the secure confines of 
the International Zone were far too removed 
from the realities of neighborhood conflict to 
be effectual. The dissolution of the FAQ Politi-
cal Committee was certainly demonstrative 
of this reality. The apparent inadequacy of 
legislation, however, did not deter the prime 
minister from devising alternative political 
solutions and establishing an official cabinet 
committee to address essential services.
Political Dynamics
Baghdad’s political parties, personali-
ties, and demographics played a fundamental 
role in shaping the outcome of FAQ and the 
delivery of services. The political dynam-
ics were bewildering and were made even 
more complicated when accounting for the 
discrepancies between local and national 
perspectives. The most salient political parti-
tion existed between religious sects. Sunnis 
were predominantly aligned with the Tawafuq 
bloc, which was comprised of three separate 
political parties: the Iraqi Islamic Party, the 
Iraqi People’s Conference, and the National 
Dialogue Council. The initial chairman 
of the FAQ Essential Services Committee, 
Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zoubai, was 
a notable member of this alliance. Meanwhile, 
the majority of Shia belonged to the Islamic 
Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) but would 
often vie with the Sadrist Trend and its mili-
tant wing, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), for political 
primacy in Baghdad. The power struggle 
among these differing parties, both internal 
and external, created a political vacuum that 
would be detrimentally filled by militants.
Essential Services Committee. In 
support of FAQ, Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki formed the Essential Services Com-
mittee, to be headed by Zoubai. The commit-
tee was to facilitate the repair and delivery 
of essential services immediately following 
combat activity and would then submit a 
weekly status report to the prime minister 
during the Iraq Executive Steering Commit-
tee (IESC)3 meeting. During a meeting with 
Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard 
on January 10, 2007, Zoubai confirmed that 
he would be responsible for the portfolio and 
added that he had received full support from 
the prime minister.
However, on the afternoon of March 
23, a member of Zoubai’s security team 
detonated a ball bearing suicide vest inside 
Zoubai’s residence. Severely injured, Zoubai 
spent several months recuperating in Jordan. 
His absence proved debilitating to efforts to 
improve the delivery of essential services. 
Without Zoubai’s authority, his advisors felt 
powerless and were timid in presenting recon-
struction developments to the prime minister. 
The assassination attempt severely hampered 
reconstruction efforts, and the eventual with-
drawal of the Tawafuq political bloc in August 
2007 ended Zoubai’s involvement.
In November, the prime minister desig-
nated Ahmed Chalabi as temporary lead for 
Baghdad services. From the commencement of 
his appointment, however, his role and respon-
sibilities remained fluid. Chalabi did not 
occupy a constitutionally recognized cabinet 
position, and the Baghdad Amanat,4 governor, 
Provincial Council,5 and ministers did not 
necessarily recognize his authority in this 
seemingly ad hoc appointment. Furthermore, 
he did not have direct access to an official 
channel of government financial resources. 
Despite these administrative hurdles, he 
remained actively engaged, and Iraqi citizens 
tended to swarm Chalabi in public settings 
with their petitions. He cheerfully admitted 
that the purpose of his committee was “to 
provide band-aids, not structural solutions to 
problems.” Indeed, Maliki’s intent in putting 
Chalabi in charge of the committee was to 
produce quick, tangible solutions to the prob-
lems of Baghdad’s citizens.
Manipulation of Services. As Iraqi 
officials struggled to organize themselves, 
various nonstate actors took full advantage 
of the government’s vacillation and quickly 
filled the leadership vacuum. Contingent 
upon their own political loyalties, militias 
pursued distinctive agendas to manipu-
late essential services to their advantage. 
Whereas Sunni insurgents wanted to 
undermine the government’s legitimacy 
by destroying infrastructure, Shia militias 
aspired to supersede the government with 
their own informal networks. Each posed its 
own unique set of obstacles and challenges 
to the government.
Al Qaeda in Iraq favored a more ideo-
logical approach, seeking to dictate social 
mores and religious customs at the expense 
of humanitarian assistance. Consequently, 
their oppressive tactics proved counterpro-
ductive as local citizens became increasingly 
disenchanted. Sunni extremists also focused 
on insurgent activities that attracted Coalition 
Forces/Iraqi Security Forces reprisals that 
often harmed innocent civilians and neigh-
borhood property.6
On the other hand, many Shia militias 
were initially mobilized in an effort to neu-
tralize the growing atmosphere of fear and 
insecurity sparked by mounting sectarian ten-
sions. The purging of local communities may 
have begun under the precept of removing 
terrorist threats but quickly devolved into sec-
tarian displacement. In turn, the displacement 
afforded militia leaders a window of opportu-
nity to consolidate neighborhood control.
A variety of intimidation tactics were 
employed to secure the obedience of local 
residents once they had effectively expelled 
their sectarian adversary. These methods 
included bribery, verbal or physical assault, 
assassination, or public execution. After 
establishing their hegemony, militants 
would then coopt local officials and hijack 
government resources.
The JAM militia, and to a lesser extent 
ISCI, operated a sophisticated extralegal 
governance network to manage their inter-
ests and even set up subordinate offices that 
focused on administrative tasks including 
finances, public relations, and technical 
affairs. Citizens would therefore become 
artificially beholden to militias for services, 
employment, and security. These extralegal 
institutions eroded government credibility 
and perilously installed militant leaders who 
were not accountable to the local population.
Formal government institutions were 
incapable of stopping or even complicit in the 
militias’ attempts to manipulate  Baghdad’s 
parliamentarians within the secure confines of the International 
Zone were far too removed from the realities of neighborhood 
conflict to be effectual
the purging of local 
communities may have 
begun under the precept of 
removing terrorist threats 
but quickly devolved into 
sectarian displacement
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services. In particular, corruption was abun-
dant at both national and provincial levels. 
Officials would simply siphon finances, 
appoint militants to influential positions, or 
redirect reconstruction projects to areas dom-
inated by their respective political parties. 
The Board of Supreme Audit, the independent 
Iraqi agency that served as a watchdog to 
monitor financial and administrative opera-
tions of the government, was inadequately 
equipped to investigate the accusations and 
was equally plagued with political interfer-
ence, intimidation/assassination of agents, 
and limited resources.
The combination of institutional inepti-
tude and inability of Iraqi officials to delineate 
responsibilities among themselves highlighted 
the inchoate nature of the government. Many 
were uncertain of their legal authorities and 
lacked the conviction necessary to spearhead 
public policy. This allowed municipal direc-
torates to be held hostage by the actors who 
sought their control. Representatives of various 
U.S. Government agencies urged the Iraqis to 
adopt procedures that would instill transpar-
ency and mitigate vulnerabilities, particularly 
in the delivery of essential services.
Improving Essential Services
Perhaps the most significant impedi-
ment to rebuilding Baghdad’s infrastructure 
was the absence of communication among the 
politicians who managed the city’s institutions. 
The plethora of independent funding sources 
precluded synchronization of projects and fos-
tered an atmosphere of haphazard reconstruc-
tion. Meanwhile, corruption and militia inter-
ference inhibited local access to services. The 
U.S. Government continuously encouraged 
the government to implement administrative 
reforms, and as a result the Joint Planning 
Committee and Project Clean Delivery were 
launched as cooperative ventures.
Joint Planning and Reconstruction 
Committees. It became astonishingly evident 
that Iraqi officials failed to communicate with 
each other at even the most basic levels. Min-
istries did not fully appreciate the interdepen-
dence of their respective sectors. For example, 
the delivery of clean water to Baghdad resi-
dents required fuel to run electric generators, 
and subsequently water treatment facilities 
required electricity to power pumping units. 
Above all, security was needed to protect the 
linear infrastructure that actually delivered 
the product. These requirements clearly 
encompassed many different ministerial 
portfolios, the extent of which was not fully 
appreciated by the Iraqis.
Reconstruction initiatives were also 
pursued simultaneously by several entities 
without knowledge of each other’s activities. 
The efforts were both duplicative and coun-
terproductive. It was not uncommon for one 
agency to repave a neighborhood street only 
to see it excavated by another agency the fol-
lowing week to lay new sewage pipes.
To redress the problem, the Department of 
State and Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF–I) 
established the Joint Reconstruction Operations 
Center (JROC) and Joint Planning Commit-
tee (JPC). By decree of Fragmentary Order 
#06–468, the concept of operations stated:
The Joint Reconstruction Operations Center 
will be a single-source fusion center that 
provides a common operating picture of all 
non-kinetic projects and programs that impact 
the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). The JROC 
will conduct planning that synchronizes and 
integrates non-kinetic projects and programs in 
support of BSP. During the execution of a plan 
the JROC will monitor and track the status of 
each project and program followed with an 
assessment of the effect created.7
The key deliverable of the JROC was a 
weekly brief to the JPC, which was intended 
to provide strategic direction. Committees 
included a myriad of both government of 
Iraq and U.S. Government implementing 
agencies, but more importantly, members 
were derived from local Iraqi organiza-
tions to ensure community interests were 
adequately represented. The group reviewed 
neighborhood projects, verified mechanisms 
were in place to deliver essential services, 
and adjudicated conflicts between different 
organizations. In attempting to maximize 
resources, the JPC concentrated on what 
became known as SWET–H (sewage, water, 
electrical, trash, and health). Any conflict 
that could not be resolved in the JPC would 
theoretically be elevated to the IESC. In 
practice, however, this never occurred.
Ryadh al-Falahi, an advisor to Zoubai, 
served as JPC chairman and provided 
national oversight to an otherwise local 
endeavor. His role was vital in verifying that 
district councils were actively committed to 
representing their community. Falahi also 
had the ability to understand the indigenous 
mindset, which was often culturally difficult 
for coalition members to perceive. To satisfy 
the U.S. Government objective of appear-
ing impartial, Falahi provided a sense of 
legitimacy and an aura of Iraqi ownership 
to a committee that was otherwise wholly 
American.
The JPC offered a forum in which Iraqi 
leaders vented frustrations and supported 
local development efforts. Perhaps most 
notably, it allowed Iraqis to jointly manage 
financial expenditures with their American 
colleagues. This was a vital arrangement con-
sidering that roughly 30 percent of projects 
funded by the U.S. Government were disputed 
by Baghdad’s district councils and/or Amanat. 
Consequently, the JPC served to counter per-
ceptions of misdirected funding and ensured 
that demand equitably met supply.
In and of itself, the JPC was a momen-
tous feat, but it admittedly failed to achieve 
the aspirations originally envisioned by Wash-
ington. The lack of a higher Iraqi authority, 
particularly Zoubai, rendered Falahi power-
less to elevate issues to the IESC. Furthermore, 
absence of the mayor, Provincial Council 
chairman, and governor meant that decisions 
made during the JPC were not guaranteed to 
be enforced by provincial leadership.
Iraq Executive Steering Committee
  Baghdad Security Plan  
Reconstruction Process
Joint Planning Committee
Joint Reconstruction Operations Center
INPUTS
Amanat, Provincial Council, Ministries, 
Brigade Combat Teams, other U.S. 
agencies
Joint Planning Committee 
members were derived from 
local Iraqi organizations to 
ensure community interests 
were adequately represented
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Instead, the JPC simply became a 
medium for situational awareness. This was 
not necessarily a negative outcome since the 
government of Iraq had limited knowledge 
of ongoing projects within the city. The 
committee also cultivated an environment 
in which Iraqis became acquainted with 
one another. State Department attendees 
frequently witnessed Iraqi officials exchang-
ing contact information for the first time. 
Most importantly, the JPC introduced an 
administrative mechanism that encouraged 
cooperation and dialogue among all Iraqi 
agencies. Such horizontal linkages were 
nonexistent during the previous regime. 
The effect was an improvement in commu-
nications among all relevant parties, which 
the U.S. Embassy considered a significant 
achievement of the FAQ.
To capitalize on the success, inter-
nalization of the JPC was crucial to ensure 
long-term sustainability. Since its inception, 
the goal had always been to transfer the JPC 
to the Iraqi government, but the difficulty 
was determining who would actually assume 
ownership. The U.S. Government privately 
debated the merits of national versus pro-
vincial control within the context of the new 
federalist structure of Iraq. At the same time, 
the Iraqis grappled with similar questions as 
they struggled to form their new nation. Until 
a settlement could be reached, the JPC contin-
ued to be managed entirely by the Americans 
with Iraqi participation.
On March 13, 2008, however, the 
Baghdad Provincial Council finally took pos-
session of the JPC and hosted the meeting for 
the first time at its headquarters. The commit-
tee would now be chaired by council member 
Nazar al-Sultani, who in his opening remarks 
noted the historical significance of the transi-
tion. Over the course of the following months, 
the Provincial Council slowly accepted 
responsibility for administrative duties, 
including drafting and distributing meeting 
notes. Sultani even announced on June 12 a 
new JPC format in an effort to streamline the 
overall process.
By the end of 2007, the JROC/JPC had 
successfully spawned similar forums. The 
Joint Rural Planning Committee (JRPC) 
expanded the JPC concept into the outlying 
Qadas (rural districts) of Baghdad Province. 
The initiative immediately proved successful 
by applying lessons learned from the JPC, and 
was central in reaching out to communities 
that consisted mainly of Sunnis dispersed 
along tribal lineages. Meanwhile, the Execu-
tive JPC, which had to that point been limited 
only to coalition members, incorporated 
provincial Iraqi counterparts to form the 
Baghdad Provincial Executive Planning 
Session (BPEPS). Cochaired by Provincial 
Council chairman Mueen al-Khademy and 
coalition representatives, the BPEPS was 
largely restricted to strategic discussions 
pertaining to economic development and 
essential services.
By assuming responsibility for munici-
pal reconstruction efforts, the government of 
Iraq began to demonstrate its functionality 
and dedication to the people of Baghdad. 
Iraqi ability to effectively mobilize resources 
became a source of great pride. Although 
in many respects the government may not 
have been entirely proficient by Western 
standards, it nevertheless strove to improve 
essential services. The internalization of 
the JPC symbolized a great step forward in 
achieving Iraqi goals.
Project Clean Delivery. Corruption 
was quite pervasive throughout Iraq but 
was particularly acute in the fuel sector. 
Security assessments found that the majority 
of attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure were 
financially motivated. The sale of crude oil 
derived from interdictions funded the illicit 
activities of varying groups, including insur-
gents, militias, and criminals. The interdic-
tion of pipelines forced the government to 
use tanker trucks as alternative means of 
distribution, but these too proved to be an 
easy target for theft and smuggling.
The incapability of the Ministry of Oil 
to adequately perform administrative func-
tions such as contracting and strategic plan-
ning was relentlessly exacerbated by assas-
sinations, kidnappings, and intimidation. A 
dearth of qualified technocrats to fill critical 
positions within the ministry did not bode 
well for other operations. Moreover, the min-
ister, Husayn al-Shahristani, was believed to 
be incompetent. He was accused of sectarian-
ism and often signed contracts that appeared 
exceedingly preferential to Iran.
Municipal fuel supplies were highly 
susceptible to corruption. Databases that 
recorded deliveries were egregiously fabri-
cated and did not reflect actual quantities. 
The U.S. Energy Fusion Cell also discovered 
that ministerial tankers delivered fuel to ficti-
tious gas stations that were later revealed to be 
abandoned buildings or empty lots. Residents 
were ultimately forced to purchase from the 
black market, which funded and perpetuated 
militia activities.
Project Clean Delivery was a pilot 
project initiated in December 2007 and 
entirely led by the Iraqi government via the 
National Security Advisor’s (NSA’s) office. 
The U.S. Embassy originally conceived the 
program but assumed a merely supporting 
and advisory role during its implementation. 
The purpose of Project Clean Delivery was to 















iraqi firefighters attempt to control 
blaze after terrorist rocket attack on 
oil pipeline in Kirkuk
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actors and corrupt administrators from the 
supply chain of kerosene delivery in Baghdad. 
This was achieved through intensive monitor-
ing and by ensuring delivery of product at the 
government rate. These tactics proved effica-
cious and ultimately eliminated a key source 
of revenue for Baghdad’s militant gangs. 
Overall, the process allowed government 
participants to understand the value of inter-
ministerial coordination and synchronization 
with security agencies.
In April 2008, the Iraqi interagency 
team reported that 90 percent of kerosene 
reached target neighborhoods, equating to 
5 million liters delivered to 50,000 families 
in 12 neighborhoods. This was considered 
a major accomplishment in comparison to 
previous statistics, and the militia’s reaction 
to Project Clean Delivery testified to its 
success. JAM assassinated two neighbor-
hood council members for their participa-
tion and threatened several others. The NSA 
lead, Saeed Jabour, concluded that “you can’t 
expect to transform a system that has cor-
ruption everywhere and not have problems. 
They are inevitable.”
Failure to Build. The emphasis on 
public services as a counterinsurgency 
stratagem still faced enormous obstacles 
beyond U.S. Government control. Internal 
Iraqi government power struggles and 
the ensuing political vacuum complicated 
Baghdad’s reconstruction. The Department 
of State, specifically the Iraq Reconstruction 
Management Office, had invested a great 
deal of faith in the capability of Zoubai to 
advance the Essential Services Commit-
tee. Unfortunately, Tawafuq’s withdrawal 
created a leadership void that severely hin-
dered the implementation of policy during 
FAQ. For example, in the summer of 2007, 
U.S. and Iraqi engineers jointly formulated 
a list of proposed sewage projects estimated 
at $26 million and anticipated that Zoubai 
would work with his counterparts to 
secure supplemental funding. His absence, 
however, caused these projects to languish 
until they were eventually incorporated into 
Iraq’s 2008 budget.
Tawafuq’s departure proved an unex-
pected political affair and left Washington 
with few alternatives. Department of Defense 
and State officials expressed their disapproval 
of the boycott and were disappointed with 
Tawafuq’s apparent lack of regard for Bagh-
dad’s development. During a meeting with 
the author on October 24, 2007, Vice Presi-
dent Tariq al-Hashimi seemed completely 
oblivious to the implications that Tawafuq’s 
withdrawal would have for efforts to improve 
essential services. Nevertheless, the Ameri-
cans understood the nature of the dispute 
and realized that the matter would have to be 
resolved internally among the Iraqis as part 
of the natural growing process of the country. 
The U.S. Government would instead foster 
other Iraqi partnerships, most conspicuously 
with Chalabi.
Lights Out on Chalabi. In light of Cha-
labi’s notorious past, U.S. officials internally 
disputed how to best approach his new role 
as head of the Essential Services Committee. 
Some were eager to establish a rapport with 
Chalabi, who could potentially petition for 
requisite services, while others proposed 
marginalizing him in favor of  bolstering 
existing municipal institutions. The end 
result was consistent U.S. Government 
attendance at Chalabi’s committee meet-
ings but refrainment from forging intimate 
relations. In essence, the State Department 
merely reported on deliberations within the 
committee.
By spring of 2008, a plethora of reports 
began to surface that implicated Chalabi 
in associating with JAM Special Groups. 
He was also accused of other nefarious 
activities, including arms sales and money 
laundering. Of course, the acknowledged 
conventional difficulty with information is 
the inability to substantiate its veracity, but 
the quantity and consistency of the report-
ing proved particularly alarming. If the 
reports were indeed factual, it was assayed 
that Chalabi’s actions were not likely to have 
been motivated by malice or sectarianism, 
but rather personal gain consistent with his 
modus operandi.
Regardless, the reports compelled 
both MNF–I and the U.S. Embassy to alter 
their respective postures and no longer 
engage with Chalabi or his staff. Further-
more, a moratorium had been placed on the 
issuance of all International Zone badges 
for Chalabi’s office, and existing U.S. visa 
applications were denied to various staff 
members. The prime minister took a similar 
course of action by officially removing 
Chalabi as head of the Essential Services 
Committee and instructing him to no 
longer attend the IESC.
The author estimated that the decision 
to marginalize Chalabi would have only a 
negligible effect on Baghdad services. He 
had been a nominal contributor to the city’s 
development, and his staff infrequently 
attended various intergovernmental coor-
dination meetings. Moreover, the U.S. 
Embassy’s Iraq Transition and Assistance 
Office and the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team both believed that Baghdad’s essential 
services should be predominantly led by 
provincial leaders (governor, Provincial 
Council chairman, and mayor). Baghdad was 
unique in that the majority of services were 
managed by the Amanat rather than minis-
tries, although the ministries still played a 
critical role.
A Symbol of Success
Overall, the government of Iraq 
proved relatively adept in responding to the 

















iraqi prime minister attends opening 
ceremonies of reconstructed sarafiya 
Bridge in Baghdad, May 2008
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prominent symbol of its success during the 
FAQ was the rebuilding of the Sarafiya Bridge. 
Constructed by British engineers in the early 
20th century, the bridge was an important 
commercial and transportation link over the 
Tigris River and a source of national pride. 
Sadly, on April 12, 2007, suicide bombers 
detonated a truck laden with explosives while 
driving over it. The blast destroyed the bridge 
and brought down the main central spans, 
negatively affecting commerce and municipal 
traffic flow. Baghdad’s residents were deeply 
demoralized by its destruction.
Despite some initial obstacles, all 
efforts to rebuild the Sarafiya Bridge were 
orchestrated autonomously by the Iraqi 
government with limited U.S. assistance. 
Construction, managed entirely by the 
Ministry of Construction and Housing, was 
completed on time and within budget and 
was officially reopened on May 27, 2008. The 
undertaking demonstrated the government’s 
capacity to independently pursue emergency 
reconstruction of crucial infrastructure 
and became one of the most significant 
Iraqi accomplishments of the FAQ. Indeed, 
during the May 26, 2008, IESC, Prime Min-
ister Maliki called the bridge’s reopening a 
“victory over terrorism.”
Depending on their respective affilia-
tions, American politicians are persistent in 
their attempts to label the Baghdad Security 
Plan as either a success or failure. Militar-
ily, the surge could certainly be hailed as a 
success when juxtaposed against statisti-
cal trends, but such operations were only 
intended to provide space for political recon-
ciliation and economic development. These 
aspects were the sine qua non of Iraq’s long-
term stability but were much more difficult to 
quantify. In the absence of pivotal legislation 
or significant expenditures, they could only 
be measured subjectively, often based on tacit 
developments. The establishment of horizon-
tal linkages and improved lines of intercom-
munication among Iraqis as a result of the 
JPC was a painstaking process that could 
only be ascertained over a prolonged period 
and exemplifies the challenge in perceiving 
such subtleties.
Equally difficult to discern, but of tan-
tamount importance, was the overall capacity 
of the Iraqi government. By and large, the 
author noticed measured progress in the 
cabinet members’ ability to identify and 
present issues of concern to the IESC. Previ-
ously, discussants often were unprepared, 
and the resultant briefings were haphazard. 
By January 2008, however, visible improve-
ments began to surface. During the January 
11 IESC, the Minister of Displacement and 
Migration identified specific problems 
requiring government attention, and on 
January 25, the Deputy Minister of Commu-
nications deftly articulated the current status 
of his ministry, complete with graphic rep-
resentation. Both presentations indicated an 
increasing capability to recognize and convey 
matters within their respective sectors. More-
over, the IESC Secretariat conducted 6-month 
and 1-year self-assessments of accomplish-
ments and shortcomings of each FAQ sup-
porting committee, a remarkable feat given 
the level of maturity of the Iraqi government.
The author observed a gradual 
improvement in Maliki’s capability as prime 
minister. He appeared more confident in his 
position and became increasingly intolerant 
of unresponsive cabinet members. Military 
operations initiated in March 2008 that tar-
geted Shia militias in both Basrah and Sadr 
City and Sunni terrorists in Mosul evinced 
Maliki’s impartiality. He proclaimed in April 
that the events “have proven that we are 
neutral, not biased, that we did not take the 
side of this party or this sect against another. 
We have also proven there is no security for 
any sect unless other sects can be guaranteed 
their security.”
These developments were not exclusive 
to the executive branch, as legislative officials 
also exhibited maturation. The February 13, 
2008, passage of several pieces of legislation 
demonstrated that the Council of Representa-
tive’s speaker, Mahmoud Mashadani, was 
becoming more comfortable as leader of the 
parliament and testified to his ability to nego-
tiate between dissimilar political blocs.
Above all, Iraqi officials were cognizant 
of the value of using essential services as a 
counterinsurgency tactic. Zoubai asserted 
to State Department officials at the onset of 
the FAQ that “security and services cannot 
be separated.” On June 11, 2008, the deputy 
prime minister’s chief of staff, Khalid al-
Juboory, affirmed the significance of services 
military operations that 
targeted Shia militias in both 
Basrah and Sadr City and 
Sunni terrorists in Mosul 
evinced Maliki’s impartiality
as a COIN policy, stating that “providing 
electricity, providing education, and rehabili-
tating detainees will help solve the problem 
of militias. . . . We have learned that many 
join militias simply for money and are not 
necessarily religious extremists.” Khalid 
stressed that electrical reconstruction proj-
ects would provide employment that would 
reduce the incentive to join militias and 
added that “electricity also limits movements 
of terrorists at nights and opens shops.” 
Ultimately, “electricity solves security and 
services problems.” In this respect, President 
Bush’s January 10, 2007, address proved par-
ticularly astute in proclaiming that “a suc-
cessful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military 
operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see 
that military operations are accompanied by 
visible improvements in their neighborhoods 
and communities.”8
Any comprehensive appraisal of coun-
terinsurgency tactics in Iraq must recognize 
the delivery of essential services as one of the 
most significant components of a multifaceted 
strategy. Supported by the United States, the 
Iraqi government pursued initiatives that 
eliminated opportunities for malign non-
state actors to operate while simultaneously 
boosting its own credibility. Such policies 
reinforced other factors to engender overall 
positive trends in Baghdad that saw a weaken-
ing of the influence of militias and insurgents 
and a strengthening of the legitimacy and 
efficacy of the government of Iraq during the 
execution of the Baghdad Security Plan.  JFQ
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